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 Lyndon Johnson once said: “I seldom think of politics more than eighteen hours a day.” 
Driven by a ravenous need to accumulate power and exercise control over others, Lyndon 
Johnson was obsessed with politics, and was determined to win the Presidency. Although indeed 
partially ideologically motivated to help the most impoverished members of American society, 
Johnson was not an idealistic crusader, but instead an intense pragmatist who almost always 
made the political choices that would best advance his career and increase the amount the power 
he possessed, not the choices that would most immediately benefit society. Johnson’s desire to 
accumulate power is rooted in a complex set of motivators, each of which played an intricate role 
in the development of his political ambition. Having witnessed his father’s downfall from a state 
legislator to a disrespected member of the Texas Hill Country, Lyndon Johnson possessed a 
strong desire to repair his family’s reputation. The Hill Country also exposed Johnson to the 
suffering that many Americans endured simply because of the unlucky circumstances of their 
birth. Johnson was motivated to help these underprivileged Americans, but not at the expense of 
his own political viability. And, to ensure his political viability Johnson employed a wide array 
of techniques to consolidate power. Johnson developed close connections with influential 
Washington politicians, and courted the backing of wealthy Texas business interests, using these 
friendships and connections to make himself useful to his colleagues in Congress. In addition, 
Johnson was careful not to fall victim to the idealism that plagued his father by not taking 
controversial positions and making ideological stances, thus preserving his future political 
viability, and revealing his belief that to achieve the power necessary to create positive change, 




Psychological Motivations  
The ascension of Lyndon Johnson to the presidency has its roots deeply embedded within 
the desolation of the Texas Hill Country. Characterized by “250 miles of featureless…plains,” 
the Hill Country “was a trap” for all those who dared to enter it.1 Those who settled in the Hill 
Country consciously “left civilization as far behind as safety,” as conditions in the Hill Country 
were far “more primitive than in other states.”2 The plains of central Texas were so inhospitable 
that they “required an end to illusions, to dreams, to flights into the imagination—to all the 
escapes from reality that comfort men—for in a land so merciless, the faintest romantic tinge to a 
view of life might result not just in hardship but in doom.”3 This is the land in which Lyndon 
Johnson’s family chose to settle. But, the Johnsons “were impractical”—they “were dreamers” 
who had “a streak of romanticism in them.”4 The Johnsons were idealists who aimed to conquer 
the hostility of the Hill Country. Sam Johnson, Lyndon Johnson’s father and a son of the Hill 
Country, had an insatiable ambition “to become something more than a farmer.”5 However, he 
found it difficult to emerge from the tight grip of Hill Country poverty, and “he found it 
necessary to make a living immediately” instead of pursuing his ambitions.6 Sam Johnson was 
forced to put his ambitions on hold, and conform to the realities of the Hill Country—although 
he always strived to be something more than a farmer, a farmer is what he was forced to be.  
 Although the Hill Country trapped him, Sam Johnson did not let go of his ambition to 
become something more than a Texas farmer. In 1904, Johnson decided to run to fill the seat of 
the 89th District in the Texas House of Representatives. Johnson defeated his opponent, and 
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found a home in the State House in Austin—“the young man who had hated the cornfields found 
that he loved the cloakrooms.”7 A master of persuasion and legislating, Sam Johnson felt 
comfortable in the Texas State House, and began to identify himself as a champion of populist 
causes.8 Like his family who had previously settled in the Texas Hill Country, Johnson possessed 
a strong sense of idealism—a quality lacking among the many state legislators who “trade[d] 
votes for cash” and accepted the offers of powerful lobbyists to “pay for their Austin meals and 
hotel bills” to offset the “low salaries” that legislators were paid.9 Johnson was a populist; “he 
fought against…powerful” interests such as the “Texas Medical Association;” he fought to 
“regulate banks [and] railroads,” and to “force producers of sulphur, oil, and natural gas to pay 
through taxes enough to ameliorate the living conditions of the people of the state from whose 
earth they were mining such immense wealth.”10 
 As a young boy, Lyndon Johnson was drawn to his father’s idealism and political 
involvement. Even at the age of three, Lyndon would follow his father to the barbershop, “where 
he insisted on sitting in a chair, having his hair covered with lather, and…getting a shave like 
Sam.”11 When Lyndon turned ten, “Sam began taking him to the legislature, where [he] would 
‘sit in the gallery for hours watching all the activity on the floor and then would wander around 
the halls trying to figure out what was going on.”’12 But, Lyndon enjoyed “going with [his 
father] on the campaign trail” even more than going with him to Austin to observe the 
legislature.13 From a young age, politics was “engrained” in Lyndon Johnson; he was exposed to 
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the art of legislating, and to the importance of retail politics.14 Lyndon Johnson grew up in a 
“highly politicized” home—an environment conducive for “endowing children with the 
motivation prerequisites for later [political] participation.”15 By being exposed to politics at such 
a young age, Lyndon Johnson was instilled with “the belief that [he had] the power to take part 
in the democratic process,”16 giving fuel to his political ambition by making him believe that he 
too could be a political figure like his father, and thus “significantly increase[ing] [his] 
propensity to consider running for office as an adult.”17  
 But, while Sam Johnson’s idealistic political career did undoubtedly contribute to the 
development of Lyndon Johnson’s political ambition, Sam’s idealism proved fatal to his 
financial success, causing a rift to emerge between Sam and his son that would prove to not be 
repairable and would also help fuel his son’s political ambitions. Because so many legislators 
were complicit in legislating on behalf of entrenched and powerful interests in Texas, such as oil 
and gas interests, banking interests, and the railroads, “state jobs—better paying than legislative 
seats—were available to many…legislators.”18 However, Sam Johnson “refused to come to 
terms with the realities of Austin,” and thus when he sought a better paying job, he received no 
offers.19 Because Sam Johnson could not make a better living by obtaining a state job, he had to 
find a way to supplement his income as a state legislator. When he was not “in Austin for a 
legislative session or driving a hundred miles to…help a Civil War veteran get his pension,” Sam 
would work “hard at real-estatin’.”20 Unfortunately, the same idealism that plagued Sam Johnson 
in Austin plagued him in his real estate investments as well. Upon the death of Sam’s mother in 
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1917, Sam knew that he had to keep her most prized possession—the Johnson farm, a 433 acre 
piece of land in the Hill Country—in the family.21 Unwilling to allow the farm to be sold to an 
outsider, or divided up amongst his siblings, Sam bought the ranch—an investment that was a 
consequence of “the old Johnson pride,” and an investment marked by his ambition to “restor[e] 
the once-grand Johnson fortunes.”22 However, to restore these fortunes, and to fulfill his idealism 
of remaking the Pedernales Valley back into “Johnson Country,” Sam Johnson was forced to not 
only “sell every piece of property he owned,” but also had to place a “mortgage of $15,000” on 
the property and borrow “additional money from at least three banks, going deeply into debt.”23  
 Falling victim to the same legislative idealism that plagued him in his failed search for a 
state job, Sam Johnson’s idealistic goal of restoring the Johnson Ranch to its former glory 
clouded his judgment, causing him to minimize the harshness of the Hill Country— the routine 
failure of the Hill Country soil to lift farmers out of poverty. He made a “stand” in the “cotton 
field” that was as “gallant as any he had made in the cloakroom…trying to make [the] soil pay 
out the dreams he had planted in it.”24 But, just as Austin was hostile to idealistic lawmakers, 
“the Hill County was a land that broke romantics, dreamers, wishful thinkers, and idealists—it 
broke Sam Johnson.”25 Not long after purchasing the ranch, Sam defaulted on the payments, and 
lost the ranch to the mortgage holder. However, not only did Sam lose the ranch, but also he 
“still owed banks the money he had borrowed” to pay for farming equipment; and, “he still 
owed” money to “merchants” all over the Pedernales Valley.26 The Johnson family was forced to 
leave the farm and move back to Johnson City, where Sam Johnson’s reputation, and therefore 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Caro, The Years of Lyndon Johnson: The Path to Power, 85-86.  
22 Ibid, 86.  
23 Ibid, 87.  
24 Ibid. 
25Ibid, 89.  
26Ibid, 90.  
Kramer 6 
the reputation of the Johnson family, was severely damaged. Facing financial ruin, and owing 
money to people all across the valley, Sam Johnson faced ridicule from those who had formerly 
viewed him with great esteem and respect. Johnson was “unable to pay back bills at Johnson 
City stores,” and was forced to travel to other Hill Country towns to find merchants who would 
extend him credit.27  
 The demise of Sam Johnson not only as a politician, but as a respectable member of the 
Texas Hill Country, not only ruined Sam Johnson, but it also destroyed his relationship with his 
son, Lyndon. As his father continued to fall deeper into debt, and continued to lose the respect he 
had once garnered from the Hill Country community, “the distance between” Lyndon and his 
father “became wider and wider and Lyndon’s rebelliousness and disdain became more and more 
evident.”28 Whereas Lyndon Johnson clung to his father on the campaign trail, and relished the 
opportunity to accompany his father to the State House in Austin, after Sam Johnson was ruined 
by his idealism and by the harshness of the Hill Country soil, “defiance” of his father “became a 
predominant feature of his behavior.”29 Lyndon began to defy his father by sneaking the car out 
“after his parents had gone to sleep,” and by “ignor[ing] his [father’s] orders” such as “not to use 
his shaving mug.”30 Lyndon Johnson witnessed how his father was destroyed by his idealism, 
and how Sam Johnson’s romanticism impoverished the Johnson family, tarnishing the family’s 
reputation. Sam Johnson had gone from respected legislator—a populist who worked tirelessly 
on behalf of his constituents—to a member of society who faced ridicule from the people he at 
one time represented in Austin. Witnessing his father’s fall from respected politician to mocked 
citizen, and his family’s fall from respect to scorn, fueled Lyndon Johnson’s political ambition, 
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instilling in him a passionate desire to “overcom[e]…a low respect position through the use of 
power and other available means.”31 Lyndon Johnson would use his father’s downfall to fuel his 
“burning ambition” to “restore” prestige to the Johnson family name, and to seek “revenge” on 
the forces of idealism and romanticism that “deprived” his father, and his family, of the power he 
believed they deserved.32 The destruction of his relationship with his father accentuates the 
importance of power and respectability to Lyndon Johnson; whereas Lyndon revered his father 
when he was an influential legislator and respected citizen, he rebelled against his father when he 
dragged his family deep into debt and eliminated the Johnson family’s respectability. Therefore, 
Lyndon Johnson’s political ambition was guided at least in part by a passionate rejection of 
idealism, and instead a full embrace of practicality and pragmatism—an insatiable desire to 
restore the Johnson name, to help his family emerge from the “marginal position” in society that 
they occupied after Sam Johnson’s failures.33  
Ideological Motivations 
 In addition to the psychological motivations associated with being exposed to, and 
surrounded by politics from a young age, and with witnessing the destruction of the fortune and 
reputation of his father and family, ideological motivations also account for a degree of Lyndon 
Johnson’s intense political ambition. While in college, as a teacher “at a Mexican-American 
grade school in Cotulla, Texas,” Lyndon Johnson was exposed to “one of the crummiest towns in 
all of Texas.”34 Cotulla and the surrounding area “was a flat, treeless, wilderness” in which 
“three-quarters of the town’s inhabitants were Mexicans living in hovels or dilapidated shanties 
without indoor plumbing or electricity” who “worked at nearby ranches or farms for slave 
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wages.”35 The other residents in the town were white, and lived in better conditions—many lived 
in small houses and enjoyed conveniences such as electricity and plumbing. As a teacher in 
Cotulla’s segregated Mexican school, Johnson was exposed to students who were “mired in the 
slums…lashed by prejudice…[and] buried half alive in illiteracy.”36 However, whereas “the 
other five teachers in the school…kept their distance from the children, doing the minimum 
required in their jobs,” Johnson “threw himself into his work with unbound energy.”37 Johnson 
was not content with sitting idly by and watching his students suffer because of the difficult 
conditions to which they were born into, through no fault of their own. Rather, he was 
determined to give his students an opportunity to emerge from poverty.  
 Believing that the Mexican-Americans he taught in Cotulla were hindered by 
circumstances beyond their control, “the wretched condition of his students struck a sympathetic 
chord in Lyndon Johnson.”38 Johnson sympathized with his students because of his conviction 
that “his Mexican-American pupils possessed” genuine desires to be successful and productive 
citizens, but that these desires were being “stifled and denied…by the impoverishing conditions 
of their lots.”39 Because they had the same desires to be successful as others who were born into 
conditions more favorable to success, Johnson believed that if given the same opportunities as 
other citizens, his students, too, would be able to achieve their respective dreams. Therefore, 
Johnson tirelessly served as an advocate for his students, and committed himself to ensuring that 
his students were given access to the same resources and educational instruction as other, more 
fortunate students. In fact, Johnson was so committed to guaranteeing that his students had 
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access to all the resources they would need to succeed, he “invested half of his first month’s 
salary to buy” sporting equipment for his students so they could play, and develop an “ability to 
compete”—a skill Johnson deemed one must have to be successful. In addition, “Johnson 
refused to accept the fact that many of his students had never learned English,” because he was 
“convinced that without English their future opportunities would be severely limited.”40 
Consequently, Johnson forbade his students from speaking Spanish on school property.  
 The commitment to his students that Lyndon Johnson exhibited during his time teaching 
in Cotulla reveals the intensity of his compassion for the plight of his Mexican-American 
students, and his belief that giving the underprivileged an opportunity to emerge from poverty 
would allow even the most unfortunate people to achieve their dreams. His desire to give his 
students, and other underprivileged people like them, more opportunities to emerge from the 
depths of poverty is revealed by his unwavering advocacy on behalf of his students, and by his 
willingness to devote not only his time, but also his personal financial resources to give his 
students access to resources that could help make them better able to achieve success. As 
President, in his March 1965 “speech proposing the voting rights bill, [he] explained that his 
convictions on this issue were rooted in his experience as a teacher of Mexican-American 
students in Cotulla, Texas.”41 Johnson “told the joint session of Congress,” and the country, how 
his “students were poor…often [coming] to class without breakfast, hungry,” and how his 
students, “even in their youth [knew] the pain of injustice.”42 As he revealed in his speech 
introducing the Voting Rights Act of 1965, Lyndon Johnson’s experiences as a teacher in 
Cotulla, and the abject poverty amongst Mexican-Americans he witnessed while there, was at 
least in part what motivated him to seek an office that would allow him to pass legislation to give 
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those students, and millions like them, a chance to improve their lot. Johnson was motivated to 
seek political office in part because of the knowledge that with political power, he could 
personally have a hand in ensuring that those born into unfortunate circumstances would be 
given the opportunities necessary to guarantee that they, too, would be able to achieve their goals 
and dreams.  
An Insatiable Desire for Power 
 While Lyndon Johnson’s political ambition was indeed fueled in part by ideological 
motivations—a desire to use his accumulated power to help give the underprivileged the 
opportunities they need to emerge from the depths of poverty—Johnson was always pragmatic, 
and chose political viability over ideological purity. Johnson was motivated by an insatiable 
desire for power, and ultimately an innate need to dominate others. Sometimes he was forced to 
temporarily suppress his domineering nature in order to win the favor of others, but eventually, 
once he established the necessary relationships with colleagues and subordinates, he sought to, 
and would employ almost any means necessary, to dominate them. Furthermore, once Johnson 
had firmly established his domination over his subordinates, and established himself as a 
formidable figure, he took pains to ensure than those around him were aware of his power.  
 After being elected to the United States House of Representatives to represent the 
Fourteenth Congressional District of Texas in a 1931 special election, Richard Kleberg soon 
called Lyndon Johnson—a young man who had gained a reputation of being a wonder boy of 
Texas politics—to ask Johnson to accompany him to Washington and serve as his private 
secretary. Johnson jumped at the opportunity to join Kleberg on Capitol Hill, and once there, he 
sought to dominate. He saw a chance to satisfy his instinctive need to accumulate power in 
leading “The Little Congress”—a “moribund organization” modeled after the House of 
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Representatives that was created “in 1919 to provide congressional secretaries with experience in 
public speaking and a knowledge of parliamentary procedures.”43 The Little Congress, however, 
had deteriorated into not much more than a social club, in which only a handful of congressional 
secretaries attended meetings.44 But, Johnson harbored a desire to revive the Little Congress as a 
means of increasing his own power and visibility in Washington; and, as a congressional 
secretary who had just recently arrived in Washington, he devised a plan to become the 
organization’s Speaker. Johnson formed a coalition of new congressional secretaries and a group 
of “unfamiliar faces”—people such as mailmen who were on the “legislative payroll” but who 
previously had not participated in the Little Congress—to win an election that some veteran 
congressional secretaries claimed he stole by stuffing the ballot boxes with the votes of every 
Capitol Hill employee he could find.45 His colleagues questioning the morality of the techniques 
Johnson employed to gain power within the Little Congress reveals how desperate of a desire he 
had to accumulate power, and how Johnson planned to utilize the Little Congress to further 
increase his own power. In his acceptance speech after being elected Speaker, Johnson, revealing 
his intentions to transform the Little Congress into an organization that was defined as something 
more important than a social club, enthusiastically proclaimed: “My election will mark a New 
Deal for all Little Congresses.”46  
 After his election to the Speakership of the Little Congress, Johnson aimed to transform 
the organization from an inactive and meaningless one, into an organization that could help him 
accumulate power and establish a reputation in Washington. Immediately, “Johnson announced 
meetings would be held not every month but every week, and would include not only debates but 
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speeches by ‘prominent figures.’”47 Johnson’s assistants knew the sole purpose of wanting to 
invite important speakers to address the Little Congress was so that Johnson would have “an 
excuse to go and see Huey Long or Tom Connally or a Texas Congressman who was head of a 
committee he thought he might need for something, and invite them to speak.”48 Inviting 
powerful Congressman to speak to the Little Congress gave Johnson an excuse to see these men, 
and Johnson would ensure that each Congressman he invited to speak would “remember him.”49 
In addition to being able to accumulate power through the connections he made with 
influential Congressman, Johnson organized important debates in the Little Congress, and “he 
asked newspapers to cover them,” increasing the publicity of the organization, and consequently, 
as the organization’s leader, increasing Johnson’s media visibility.50 The Little Congress held 
“votes on pending legislation,” and these votes became “previews of upcoming votes in the Big 
Congress,” causing the press to cover the Johnson-led organization more frequently.51 Indeed, 
press coverage of the Little Congress was so abundant, and the debate and votes in the Little 
Congress were such accurate predictors of how the debate and final vote on pending legislation 
would unfold, that “members of Congress wanted their bills debated by the Little Congress for 
publicity, and because it would help them prepare for debate on the floor.”52 As Speaker, 
“members of Congress” began respecting and “call[ing] upon” Lyndon Johnson to ensure that 
their respective bills were considered by the Little Congress. By making powerful Congressman 
reliant on him, Johnson revealed his need, and his ability to quickly consolidate his power. 
Johnson saw the Little Congress as a tool to make himself useful to Congressman—to make 
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them need him to help further their own political and legislative agendas.  After revealing his 
need for power by arranging to have “the ballot box for the [Speakership] of the Little Congress 
stuffed with illegal ballots” just so he would ensure himself victory, once Johnson became 
Speaker, “he took pains to let everyone know he was on the inside…strutting to display not only 
his power but the fact that he had obtained the power by trickery.”53 Johnson saw the Little 
Congress as more than a body that would teach congressional secretaries about policy issues and 
congressional procedure; he saw the Little Congress as “a means of entrée to men of power”—as 
a way to not only establish himself as a formidable figure on Capitol Hill, but as a way to prove 
to himself, and to others, that he was capable of accumulating power and commanding attention 
in Washington.54 Johnson sought to dominate and control his colleagues, and to alert Capitol Hill 
of the power he was amassing—an indicator that his political ambition was in large part fueled 
by a deprived ego that he desired inflate.55 
Deciding to Seek National Office 
 With the death of Congressman James B. Buchanan of Texas’ Tenth Congressional 
District in 1937, Lyndon Johnson finally had an opportunity to seize the national power he had 
craved for so long. But, Johnson understood that he was not the frontrunner to win a special 
election to fill Buchanan’s seat; in fact, he knew his chances of winning the seat were poor. In 
addition to understanding that he “was not well known in the district,” Johnson also knew that he 
had to compete against “five veteran politicians,”56 including “C.N. Avery, [a]…businessman 
who had been Buchanan’s campaign manager and secretary” and who claimed had been 
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“asked…to run” by Buchanan after he learned “he was dying.”57 Avery was considered a logical 
successor by many members of the Austin political class—the city at the center of the Tenth 
District—but only if Buchanan’s wife, who most considered to be Buchanan’s natural 
replacement, decided not to run.58 While Johnson knew he would have to contend with numerous 
formidable challengers, and with low name recognition in the district, he also knew his age was 
also a liability. At the age of twenty-eight, Johnson’s young age was a “drawback,” as 
“particularly in a farm district” where people are more “conservative in personal relationships,” 
people “place a high value on ‘experience.’”59 The experience Johnson did have was helping the 
constituents of Richard Kleberg—residents of the Fourteenth District—and therefore the Tenth 
District “did not know what [Johnson] had done, or what he was capable of doing.”60 After being 
appointed State Director of the National Youth Administration, Johnson did move to Austin, but 
the “directorship was not a job which entailed substantial contact with the public,” meaning that 
“in most of the district’s scores of small towns he would very hard put to find a single familiar 
face.”61 
  Although he was not considered by most of the political establishment to be a viable 
political candidate, the strength of Johnson’s ambition—his insatiable desire to emerge onto the 
national stage as a recognizable figure who could someday be President of the United States—
propelled him to launch himself into the race to fill Buchanan’s empty seat. After hearing of 
Buchanan’s death, Johnson “couldn’t focus on [his] day’s work” as Texas State Director of the 
National Youth Administration; instead, he ‘“kept thinking this was [his] district and this was 
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[his] chance.”’62 Johnson was so excited simply about the prospect of running for Congress that 
‘“there were times when [he] thought [he’d] explode from all the excitement bottled up 
inside.”’63  Indeed, Johnson viewed the special election to fill Buchanan’s seat as “quite possibly 
his only chance” to be elected to national office “for years and years to come” because “once 
Texas sent a man to Congress, Texas kept him there.”64 Long tenures in Congress were not 
unusual for elected representatives from Texas; the Texas House delegation had an average 
tenure of fourteen years—longer than that of any other state.65 Texas political history revealed to 
Johnson that “the man who won Buchanan’s seat would be in that seat to stay,” and he therefore 
understood that he had to take advantage of the opportunity to run.66 Johnson knew that “a seat in 
the House of Representatives” was the first step on the “only ladder he wanted to climb”—
elected national office—and was “indispensible” to the point that “until” he took that step “the 
others would be out of reach.”67 Although the political environment was not ideally conducive 
for Johnson to win the special election, his need to climb the national political ladder motivated 
him to seek a seat in Congress. Johnson knew that because Texans typically stayed in Congress 
for long tenures, taking a risk and entering the special election to fill Buchanan’s seat might be 
his only opportunity to reach Congress for the foreseeable future. He viewed a seat in the House 
of Representatives as the most effective way to emerge onto the national political stage—a 
crucial step towards his goal of winning the presidency—and therefore, even though the 
prospects were not good, his desire to reach “that last rung” of the political ladder “which he 
never spoke of” convinced him to enter the race.68 
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Formulating a Winning Strategy 
 Because he was considered such an underdog in the 10th Congressional District special 
election, Johnson needed to develop an effective strategy in order to achieve his goal of being 
elected to national office. Part of the Democratic solid south, Texas voters “had…supported the 
Roosevelt administration’s response to the Great Depression,” and in his 1936 re-election bid, 
“87 percent of Texas voters” casted their ballots for President Roosevelt.69 Johnson and his 
campaign strategists formulated a strategy in which Johnson’s campaign would wholeheartedly 
endorse President Roosevelt, and any program he had passed, or will pass in the future. The 
centerpiece of the campaign would be Johnson’s unequivocal endorsement of President 
Roosevelt and his policies. By being more vocal in his support of President Roosevelt and his 
New Deal than other candidates in the race, Johnson “distinguish[ed] himself from the rest of the 
crowded field,” and solved his problem of lack of name recognition by making him “easily 
recognized by voters” as “FDR’s man.”70 In addition, by strongly supporting the President, 
Johnson was able to “ride Roosevelt’s ‘coattails’ in Central Texas where the president was 
extraordinarily popular” and received both “behind-the-scenes” and “overt” support from the 
Roosevelt Administration. 
 While Johnson’s support of President Roosevelt certainly helped increase both his name 
recognition and support in his Congressional race, his ability to raise money and effectively 
spend it also helped him win an election that the political establishment said he could not win. To 
begin his campaign, Johnson solicited a $10,000 contribution from Lady Bird Johnson’s father; 
however, Johnson always had a burning need to raise additional money. Thus, “Johnson 
personally importuned successful businessmen he had dealt with as [Texas State] NYA Director” 
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and he commissioned Secretary of State Ed Clark, a strong Johnson supporter, to solicit “funds 
from state employees and those doing business with the State of Texas.”71 Many believe Johnson 
was able to raise between $75,000 and $100,000 in his first race for Congress, “a figure that 
would make the campaign one of the most expensive congressional races in Texas history up to 
that time.”72 But, not only was Johnson able to raise large sums of money—amounts so large that 
“his opponents simply couldn’t keep up—but he was also able to spend this money effectively, 
concentrating almost exclusively of the central massage of his campaign: being “FDR’s man.”73  
 Just as Johnson passionately threw himself into his work helping Mexican-American 
students in Cotulla, Johnson dedicated himself completely to his work on the campaign trail, 
making a concerted and ultimately a successful effort to campaign harder, and meet and shake 
the hands of more Texans than any of his opponents. Johnson wanted to win the special election 
so badly that he began to campaign even before Texas Governor Allred announced the date of 
the special election. Determined to make an effective appeal to Texas voters, Johnson “worked 
like a man possessed from before sun-up till well after midnight,” racing “across the 8,000 
square miles of the Tenth District speaking at rallies, attending barbecues he paid to stage, 
consulting with political leaders, and talking with every single voter he could possibly find.”74 
Moreover, Johnson did not limit his campaign efforts to the larger cities in the district, and 
instead focused also on reaching out to rural voters, driving to “individual farms and ranches, 
flattering them by his attention and appealing to their sense of political isolation.”75 By working 
tirelessly to win the votes of rural voters, and by demanding that “each and every person who 
worked for him—whether friends from school days at Southwest Texas State or staffers from the 







NYA office—work just as long and as hard as he did,” Johnson was able to win the election by a 
plurality of 3,000 votes largely because he won four of the five rural Hill Country counties by 
overwhelming margins.76 
Becoming Roosevelt’s Man in Congress 
 After running for Congress as an adamant supporter of President Roosevelt’s New Deal 
programs, Johnson as Congressman-elect sought to associate himself with Franklin Roosevelt. 
As a new Congressman, Johnson understood that acquiring good publicity was critical to being 
able to appear politically well-connected, thereby establishing himself as a person who other 
legislators could rely on to make their respective legislative goals realities. Shortly after the 
special election, President Roosevelt went to Texas for a fishing vacation in the Gulf of Mexico. 
Upon learning of the President’s trip, “Johnson had asked Governor Allred to do all he could to 
make sure” Johnson was able to meet with President Roosevelt.77 Ultimately, Johnson was 
indeed able to meet with President Roosevelt—spending an entire day with him on a train that 
traveled across Texas. Johnson knew that being photographed with President Roosevelt would 
make him appear to the public and to his colleagues in Congress to be closely connected to the 
President, giving him credibility and making others believe that he was able to wield influence 
with the White House. When he met the President, Johnson ensured that photographers were able 
to capture the “big bronzed right hand” of Roosevelt “clutch[ing]” Johnson’s hand, making 
Johnson appear as if he had not just a collegial, but even a friendly relationship with Roosevelt 
that would allow him to exert influence with the White House.78 Johnson so desired to be 
pictured with Roosevelt that when the President was talking to Governor Allred on the train, 
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Johnson “placed his…hand on the rail, and slid it a few inches toward the President, so that he 
could shit his body slightly in front of Allred without blatantly leaning into the picture.”79  
 In addition to understanding the importance of publicity to acquiring the power he 
desired to attain while in Congress, Johnson also understood the importance of establishing 
relationships with influential political figures as a means of increasing his own political power. 
In talking with President Roosevelt on his train trip through Texas after Johnson’s special 
election victory, Johnson was able to court the president and make a favorable impressive on 
him, leading Roosevelt to remark to his trusted advisor, Thomas Corcoran: ‘“I’ve just met the 
most remarkable young man. Now I like this boy, and you’re going to help him with anything 
you can.”’80 By expressing to Roosevelt—a former Secretary of the Navy under President 
Wilson with a keen interest in naval affairs— that he had “a long-standing interest in the U.S. 
Navy” and that he desired to “[establish] a naval air base at Corpus Christi,” Johnson was able to 
establish a personal connection with the President.81 Through research, Johnson knew that 
Roosevelt possessed a strong interest in the Navy, and thus emphasized his own interest in the 
Navy in an effort to develop a common bond with the President. Roosevelt was so impressed by 
the new Congressman, and so taken aback by his interest in the Navy, that he promised Johnson 
that he would personally ensure Johnson a seat on the Naval Affairs Committee, and even gave 
him the phone number of Thomas Corcoran, inviting Johnson to call Corcoran whenever he 
could “be of help.”82 President Roosevelt and Thomas Corcoran talked about Johnson with other 
powerful Washington insiders; Corcoran, referring to Johnson, even told House Naval Affairs 
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Committee Chairman, Carl Vinson: ‘“This is the boss’s protégé.”’83 By talking with powerful 
Congressman about Lyndon Johnson, and by shedding him in such a positive light, Roosevelt 
and his staff helped Johnson develop contacts with influential politicians, and develop a 
reputation as being politically connected, before he even was sworn in as a Congressman. In 
addition, Roosevelt’s fondness for Johnson, and his willingness to make the White House staff 
available to him marked Johnson as a “strong Roosevelt man and gave him access to 
Administration officials who could help his congressional career.”84 
Courting Rayburn and Acquiring Information 
 Just as Johnson was able to increase his power and enhance his reputation by developing 
a close relationship with President Roosevelt, Johnson knew that if he wanted to acquire power 
in the House of Representatives, he would have to foster a close relationship with the House 
Majority Leader, and future Speaker, Sam Rayburn. Johnson showed deference to Rayburn, 
bending down to kiss his head when the two men crossed paths in the halls of the Capitol.85 
Recognizing that Rayburn was an unmarried and  “lonely man,” Lyndon ensured that he and his 
wife Lady Bird would become Rayburn’s “surrogate family.”86 Johnson referred to Rayburn as a 
father figure to satisfy what he aptly recognized to be Rayburn’s ‘“psychological need to have a 
son.”’87 Johnson and Lady Bird would routinely invite Rayburn to their home for weeknight 
dinners and for Sunday breakfast, during which time Rayburn would shed his “laconic 
demeanor” and would instead “become more animated while he told political stories.”88 
Although Rayburn was a far more powerful political figure than Johnson at the time, Johnson 
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recognized Rayburn’s emotional void of not having a close family, especially of not having a 
son, and thus Johnson sought to effectively fill his psychological emptiness. In acting like a son 
to Rayburn, Johnson was able to make Rayburn at least somewhat psychologically dependent on 
him for emotional gratification, thereby making Rayburn willing to aid Johnson in his quest for 
political power.  
 By showing deference to Speaker Rayburn, and by acting like a son to Rayburn, Johnson 
made Rayburn feel compelled to act as a father to him, making it his own personal responsibility 
to effectively introduce Johnson to the true sources of power on Capitol Hill. At the end of each 
day, Rayburn invited a handful of House leaders—nicknamed Rayburn’s Board of Education”— 
to his hideaway office to socialize and discuss Congressional business.89 But, because of his 
fondness for Johnson, even though he lacked seniority, Rayburn routinely invited him to join the 
“Board of Education” meetings. In attending these meetings, Johnson became privy to critical 
information about House business that was desired by not only other Congressman, but by White 
House officials as well. More junior White House staffers, who could not easily obtain 
information from the “closed, confused world of Capitol Hill” began to realize that “Johnson, 
thanks to his attendance in Rayburn’s hideaway, often had the information” they needed.90 
People in the White House and on Capitol Hill began to understand that even if Johnson “didn’t 
himself have the information they needed, he could get it from Rayburn.”91 In many ways, 
Johnson became Rayburn’s protégé—someone people could turn towards to understand what 
Rayburn was thinking. Whether Rayburn intended it or not, Johnson became the “one through 
whom [Rayburn] communicate[d]” with those people who desired to ascertain the critical 
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information that he possessed.92 The information Johnson possessed, and his unfettered access to 
Rayburn, made him a Congressman that other Congressman, as well as members of the White 
House staff, wanted and often needed to befriend—someone who people were forced to rely on 
if they wanted to know about the inner-workings of the legislative process.  
Intense Pragmatism: Never Taking a Stand 
 While Johnson used the information he gathered from his close relationship with Rayburn 
to make other Congressman and White House staffers dependent on him, thereby increasing his 
own political power, Johnson’s hesitancy to take stances on controversial issues made him 
devoid of strong adversaries on either side of the political aisle. Over the course of his eleven 
years in the House, “only once did Lyndon Johnson appear in support of a national bill he had 
introduced before the committee to which it had been referred.”93 In addition, no national bill 
Lyndon Johnson introduced in the House ever received serious consideration. Moreover, while 
Johnson would indeed deliver speeches when he returned to his Texas Congressional District, he 
would not “fight publicly” for legislation in Washington, delivering less than one speech per year 
on average until he ran for the Senate in 1948.94 Johnson did not seek out reporters to comment 
on national issues, and made a concerted effort to not reveal his true opinion when asked by 
members of the media. In private conversations with other Congressman, Johnson would speak 
“very volubly,” but “wouldn’t take a position…or…say anything of a substantive nature.”95 
Instead of taking controversial positions, Johnson “was witty” and “would tell stories” about the 
Texas Hill Country to his Congressional colleagues, making him well liked among his fellow 
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Congressmen.96 Possessing ambition to run for a seat in the Senate, and eventually to win the 
Presidency, Johnson was “always aware that what he said might be repeated or remembered even 
years later,”97 and he recognized that if he took a controversial stand, it “might come back to 
haunt him someday” if the political environment or mood of the country changes.98 Additionally, 
Johnson’s reluctance to take controversial positions is a direct result of him witnessing his 
father’s political and financial downfall—a collapse Johnson attributed largely to his father’s 
boundless idealism. Johnson was determined “to avoid confrontation and choice, to prevent 
passionate and emotional divisions over issues”—rather than be an idealistic crusader like his 
father, Johnson exhibited immense pragmatism, even detachment from contentious national 
issues.99 
 By refusing to take stances on controversial issues and by acting so congenially towards 
his fellow Congressman, Johnson was able to appease Congressman from disparate locations 
along the political spectrum, increasing his likeability, thereby preserving his political viability 
and increasing his power. Because of “his charm, his storytelling ability, his desire to ingratiate 
and his skill in doing so,” Johnson “was very popular with his fellow Congressman.100 The 
popularity that Johnson garnered amongst his colleagues made other Congressman more willing 
to trust Johnson, and more willing to approach Johnson if they needed a favor or information. 
Furthermore, Johnson’s hesitance to take a position on controversial issues convinced 
“congressional liberals [that] he was one of them [and] congressional conservatives [that] he was 
one of them.”101 Liberals and conservatives in Congress alike trusted Johnson, thus making both 
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groups feel comfortable advocating for him as being a trusted member of their respective 
ideological camps. Johnson’s intense pragmatism gave him few legislative victories in the 
House, but it left him with not only a minimal number of enemies, but also a large cohort of 
Congressmen who felt comfortable identifying with Lyndon Johnson ideologically, thereby 
making him popular with a diverse group of politicians and consequently increasing his power.  
Brown & Root 
 During the first hundred days of President Roosevelt’s first term as President, he signed 
into law numerous pieces of progressive legislation designed to help the economy emerge from a 
Great Depression; one of these laws was the Emergency Relief Appropriations Act, a bill which 
empowered the Public Works Administration to give $3.3 billion in loans and grants to support 
the building of public works projects across the country. Seeing this bill, and other bills with the 
same intended goals, as opportunities to finally achieve their dream of striking it rich by building 
a massive contracting operation, Herman and George Brown applied, and were selected, to be 
the contractors charged with building the $10,000,000 Marshall Ford Dam in the Texas Hill 
Country. Although the project needed approval by Congress before Brown & Root—the 
company run by the Brown brothers—could receive both $5,000,000 appropriations that they 
would need to build the dam, the brothers decided to accept the contract before it received final 
approval by Congress because it was widely believed that Congressman Buchanan’s power 
would make Congressional authorization of the project an absolute certainty.102 However, before 
the project was approved, Buchanan died, making the Brown brothers anxious that the 
$1,500,000 they borrowed to “buy the new equipment” they needed to begin construction on the 
project would cause them to go into bankruptcy.103 Without Congressional approval, Brown & 
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Root would not receive the second $5,000,000 appropriation to build the dam, and thus only 
receive the first $5,000,000 appropriation. After all their costs, including the $1,500,000 
investment they made in equipment, Brown & Root “would be losing $500,000” without the 
second appropriation—“most of what they had accumulated in [the] twenty years” they had 
spent trying to build their contracting businesses.104 Thus, when Buchanan died, the Brown 
brothers became extremely nervous about the possibility of failing to attain approval for their 
project—a failure that would likely throw them into bankruptcy.  
 Understanding the importance of developing a strong relationship with Brown & Root to 
his political future in Texas, Johnson utilized his warm relationship with President Roosevelt, 
and his unfettered access to White House staff, to help obtain complete Congressional 
authorization of the project, thus giving Brown & Root the second $5,000,000 appropriation they 
needed to make a hefty profit. Johnson made use of his close relationship with White House aide 
Thomas Corcoran, urging Corcoran to “raise the subject of the Marshall Ford Dam with the 
President.”105 Because of his fondness for Johnson, President Roosevelt told Corcoran: ‘“Give 
the kid the dam.”’106 With the support of Roosevelt, Johnson was able to obtain congressional 
authorization for the project; however, Work Relief Administrator Harry Hopkins claimed that 
giving Brown & Root the second appropriation of $5,000,000 “would violate…fundamental 
work relief provisions” because the dam was not being built by a government agency and 
because the “labor involved was highly paid skilled labor.”107 Although “the precise nature of 
their maneuvers [is] not known,” under pressure from the Johnson-friendly White House staff, 
Hopkins withdrew his objection and Johnson was handed the “papers approving the additional 
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$5,000,000 appropriation.”108  But, after Herman and George Brown received the second 
$5,000,000 appropriation, they wanted to expand the dam at an added cost of $17 million—
requiring another appropriation. Johnson worked tirelessly to secure this additional appropriation 
for George and Herman Brown—an appropriation that would be “the base for a huge financial 
empire” that had its roots “in that deserted Texas gorge.”109  
Because of Johnson’s tireless work on their behalf, Brown & Root secured an enormous 
profit from the Marshall Ford Dam contract, and in return “Herman Brown let Johnson know that 
he would not have to worry about finances in [his] [reelection] campaign.”110 Herman Brown’s 
support meant that not only had Lyndon Johnson secured the support of Brown & Root, but also 
the support of “Brown & Root subcontractors, of banks in Austin with whom Brown & Root 
banked, of the insurance brokers who furnished Brown & Root performance bonds, of the 
lawyers who received Brown & Root’s fees, the businessmen in Austin who supplied Brown & 
Root with building materials, and the local politicians…accustomed to receiving Brown & Root 
campaign contributions in return for road building contracts.”111 Johnson’s ability to effectively 
utilize his friendships and connections at the White House to help secure Brown & Root the large 
Marshall Ford Dam contract helped Johnson solidify a strong relationship with a company that 
would largely finance Johnson’s future campaigns. A strong relationship with Brown & Root 
helped Johnson gain the trust of critical stakeholders in his district, aiding Johnson in his quest to 
solidify control over his own Congressional seat, and giving him access to campaign donors that 
would not only ensure his own future political viability, but made him able to distribute an 
abundance of campaign cash to his colleagues. Johnson’s control over large amounts of 
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campaign cash that he could contribute to his congressional colleagues increased his power 
within Congress by making his fellow Congressman rely on him for their own political success. 
Because fundraising is critical to winning elections, Johnson’s access to campaign funds made 
him a Congressman who many sought to befriend, as he would be able to provide his colleagues 
with the money they needed to have electoral success. 
Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee  
 Just as Lyndon Johnson saw in the Little Congress the potential to turn an inactive 
organization into an organization he could use to increase his own power, Johnson saw in the 
Democratic National Campaign Committee (DCCC) a dormant organization that if he could gain 
control of, he could use it to wield enormous power. A committee that historically did little to 
help Democratic Congressional candidates raise money, Johnson saw in the DCCC an 
organization in which he could reinvigorate. Although he was unable to convince Rayburn and 
President Roosevelt to appoint him as chairman of the DCCC in 1940, Johnson was able to 
convince his party leadership to give him an informal role of “assist[ing] the Congressional 
Committee.”112 Within the first week of his informal job at the DCCC, Johnson managed to 
obtain a $30,000 contribution from Brown & Root —“more money than the Democratic National 
Committee, which had in previous years been its major source of funds.”113 Because of the 
benefits they reaped from the Marshall Ford Dam contract that Johnson obtained for them, 
George and Herman Brown not only contributed money to the DCCC, but they also convinced 
their partners and friends to contribute, making Johnson able to take credit for an unprecedented 
influx of contributions to the DCCC. Johnson instructed all of his friends from Texas who 
contributed money to the DCCC to enclose with the check a letter stating which Congressmen 
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they desired their money be given to. But, Johnson would dictate to the contributors which 
names to place on the list—people who Johnson specifically wanted to receive campaign funds. 
Although Johnson was not the chairman of the DCCC, he would make sure that Congressman 
who received money from him for their respective campaigns knew that it was he who was 
responsible for obtaining the money they were receiving; he sent each campaign cash recipient a 
telegram that read: “As result of my visit to Congressional Committee few minutes ago, you 
should receive airmail special delivery letter from them which is to be mailed tonight.”114  
 In addition to sending letters to all recipients of DCCC funds, Johnson ensured the 
Congressman who were beneficiaries of his Texas money knew that it was he who was helping 
them win reelection to Congress by sending each Congressman a questionnaire asking how the 
DCCC would best help them.115 Congressman began to view Lyndon Johnson as not only 
someone who truly cared about them and their reelection efforts, but also as someone who would 
deliver on the requests they made. Many Congressman requested funds from the DCCC in the 
questionnaire believing that their requests would be fruitless; however, “to their astonishment, 
their hopes were answered.”116 Johnson personally wrote telegrams to Congressman with 
messages such as: ‘“Today I’m asking a Texas friend of mine to give me $500 for you. If he does 
I’ll take it to the Cong. Committee and ask them to rush it to you tonight.”’117 Not only did 
Johnson respond to the requests of his colleagues for campaign contributions, but he also made 
sure that his fellow Congressman knew that it was he who was responsible for them receiving the 
money they received from the DCCC.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114 Caro, The Years of Lyndon Johnson: The Path to Power, 629. 
115 Ibid, 630.  
116Ibid, 631. 
117 Ibid, 634. 
Kramer 29 
In addition to providing his colleagues with campaign contributions, Johnson also 
provided them with support from other leading Democrats who could help bolster their 
candidacies. For example, when “nationally prominent New Dealers and Cabinet members were 
heading out of Washington on speaking tours for Roosevelt,” Johnson also asked them “to speak 
for the local Democratic congressional candidate.”118Johnson also assisted Congressman who 
needed help dealing with problems in their district that were threatening their respective 
reelection efforts. Congressman Martin Smith, for instance, asked Johnson to help him resolve a 
strike that shut down the lumber mills in his district—a situation that was “arousing resentment 
towards the New Deal and threatening his reelection effort.”119 In response, and in conjunction 
with his White House allies including Thomas Corcoran, Johnson contacted labor leaders in 
Smith’s district to help end the strike. Because of Johnson’s tireless work on behalf of his 
colleagues, “suddenly, Democratic candidates…realized that there was someone in Washington 
they could turn to, someone they could ask not only for money, but other types of aid.”120 By 
forcing his fellow Congressman to rely on him for campaign contributions, Johnson was able to 
consolidate power—his access to large sums of Texas money, his ability to utilize his political 
connections to help candidates solve non-financial problems, and his ability to convince 
Congressman that he was needed for them to have electoral success, made him an increasingly 
powerful figure in Congress and in the Democratic Party.  
Conclusions 
A Senator who used his maiden speech to defend the right of southern states to maintain 
the rigid structure of segregation, and a President who signed into law the most significant pieces 
civil rights legislation in United States history, Lyndon Johnson is an extraordinarily complex 
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figure. Born in the depths of the Texas Hill Country, Lyndon Johnson was exposed to the 
poverty that plagued those who, through no fault of their own, did not have access to the same 
opportunities as the more privileged sections of American society. Johnson possessed a desire to 
help those who he believed were left behind simply by the circumstances of their birth. But, 
Johnson also rejected the idealism that many liberal crusaders possessed; he saw how his father’s 
downfall, and thus his family’s downfall, was engendered by Sam Johnson’s blind allegiance to 
idealism. Lyndon Johnson was determined not to repeat his father’s mistakes, and thus defined 
himself as a politician driven foremost by an insatiable desire for power, but also by intense 
pragmatism. Johnson understood that he could not help the underprivileged if he did not 
consolidate the power that would be necessary for him to possess if he were to be able to help all 
those he desired to help. Thus, Johnson was forced to take positions and make political 
calculations that while maybe contradictory to his own values and goals, would ultimately allow 
him to help those who were impoverished because of the unfortunate circumstances of their 
birth. The fulfillment of much of the liberal agenda during his presidency reveals the wisdom 
behind Johnson’s pragmatism. While certainly driven by an unquenchable thirst for power, 
dominance, and control, Johnson’s ability to consolidate power and his reliance on pragmatism 
instead of ideological crusades made it possible for him to witness the fulfillment of his true 
ideological platform during his Presidency.  
 
